Maryland Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 2

Article 7

Joint Bank Accounts as a Fraud on the Marital
Rights of the Surviving Spouse - Whittington v.
Whittington

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
Recommended Citation
Joint Bank Accounts as a Fraud on the Marital Rights of the Surviving Spouse - Whittington v. Whittington, 15 Md. L. Rev. 176 (1955)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol15/iss2/7

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XV

the allegations of a declaration. 4 For this reason it would
seem that an allegation of the charitable institution's nonliability without stating the facts which render it such
would be demurrable.
In the only case construing the statute2 5 the Court decided "the plaintiff here has not brought himself within
the terms of the section quoted" where the declaration
made no mention of the insurer or of the charitable institution's non-liability. 6 This case would seem to indicate
the necessity of some form of allegation whereby the court
would be notified of the insurance of the charitable institution. Furthermore the Maryland court has recognized an
exception to the rule requiring the exclusion of insurance
at the trial where it was a pertinent issue and would not
have to reach far afield to apply the same reasoning to the
situation presented here. In the total absence of any direct
ruling on the instant problem, the statute must remain as a
monument to legislative shortsightedness, and an amendment clearing up the procedural difficulty resulting from it
would apparently be welcomed by the practitioners of this
state.
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS AS A FRAUD ON
THE MARITAL RIGHTS OF THE
SURVIVING 'SPOUSE
Whittington v. Whittington'
Bessie E. Whittington and Luther E. Whittington were
married November 20, 1935, both parties having been previously married, and their respective children of the former
marriages were also married at this time. The parties lived
together happily on a farm for 16 years until the death of
Mr. Whittington on July 18, 1951. In May 1950, the deceased, who owned another farm, wanted to sell it, but his
wife was unwilling to release her dower rights, contending
that they should maintain a reserve for old age as the de1 PoE, PLEADING & PRACTICE AT LAW

(5th ed., 1925), Sec. 545 et seq.

Gent v. Cole, 38 Md. 110 (1873); Mills v. B. C. & A. Ry. Co., 111 Md. 260,
73 A. 885 (1909) ; Lapp v. Stanton, 116 Md. 197, 81 A. 675 (1911) ; Roth
v. Balto. Trust Co., 161 Md. 340, 158 A. 32 (1931) ; Brack v. Barton, 185
Md. 366, 45 A. 2d 100 (1945) ; Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Fuller Co., 111 Md.
321, 73 A. 738 (1909) ; Strauss v. Denny, 95 Md. 690, 53 A. 571 (1902);
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Shannon, 34 Md. 144 (1871).
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 48A, Sec. 82.
"Howard v. South Balto. General Hosp., 191 Md. 617, 620, 62 A. 2d
574 (1948).
'106 A. 2d 72 (Md., 1954).
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ceased had previously given his two sons various sums of
money. Later the wife, upon the promise of her husband
that she would receive 1/3 of the proceeds derived from the
sale, consented to the sale, and she received the sum of
$2,000.00 which sum was deposited by her in a joint account
with the deceased. The deceased, on June 13, 1950, took
$598.50 from an individual account along with the balance
of the proceeds from the sale of the farm and deposited the
fund equally in two joint bank accounts with his two sons,
each account contained $3,479.57. There were no additions
to or withdrawals from the funds during Mr. Whittington's
life. On September 8, 1950, Mr. Whittington took $10,000
from an individual account and caused it to be placed in two
more joint accounts with his two sons, and this left a balance of $9,000.00 in the individual account. The deceased
retained control and possession of all four pass books during his life time.
The widow, on the death of her husband, received $1,500
from an insurance policy, and she also received the $2,000.00
that she had deposited in a previously mentioned joint
account with her deceased husband. The deceased's will
was executed July 15, 1946, and was admitted to probate.
By his will, a daughter was devised an 88 acre farm absolutely and the home farm was devised to a nephew upon
condition that he pay unto testator's widow $1,000 annually
and allow her to live in the home. The residue of the estate
went absolutely to the two sons equally. The two farms
were appraised at $13,200.00 and the personal estate at
$12,016.45. The widow renounced under the will and received 1/3 of the net estate. The total amount received by
the widow was approximately $12,000, $8,300 of which she
derived from the husband's estate, $2,000.00 from the sale
of the farm and $1,500.00 from a policy of life insurance.
The widow filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County asking the court to either impose a constructive trust on the four savings accounts or
decree that the assets in the joint accounts be declared part
of the deceased's estate. The lower court denied relief holding that the four joint accounts were not a fraud on her
marital rights.2
The particular problem presented in this case is whether
"the act of creating a tentative trust of personal property
I There is also a problem in the case as to whether the execution of the
joint accounts was valid, but the court held that all of the tentative trusts
were validly executed without much difficulty by relying upon the Milholland-Whalen cases, 89 Md. 199, 43 A. 45 (1899) and 89 Md. 212, 43 A.
43 (1899).
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enuring to the benefit of two sons by a previous marriage is
a fraud on the marital rights of the second wife, gained
under the statutory heirship provisions?" A definition of a
tentative trust, also known as a "Totten Trust"' is an act
"whereby depositor opens savings account in trust for
named person, reserving right of revocation, depositor is
both settlor and trustee, retains enjoyment of the entire
income for life, may revoke the deposit by notifying the
depository or withdrawing funds and can control his own
actions as trustee".4 The case at hand concerns itself with
a conflict in two different policies of the law; namely the
free alienation of personalty by the husband during his life
and the protection of the wife's statutory heirship. The
Court of Appeals in this case affirmed the lower court and
held there was no fraud on the surviving spouse's marital
rights. There are a number of factors to be considered in
such a problem, but the Court relied strongly on the fact
that the widow was not stripped of all property, and was
left with reasonable means of support even though she was
deprived of approximately 5 forty per cent of what she otherwise would have received.
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Allender v. Allender"
said:
"The doctrine of fraud on marital rights represents
an effort to balance the social and practical undesirability of restricting the free alienation of personal
property against the desire to protect the legal share
of a spouse. It has always been recognized that a husband, in the absence of statutory regulation like that
WOADS AND PHRASES (1952), 153.
'Ibid, 154, citing Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 169 Misc. 1014, 9
*42

N. Y. S. 2d 227, 232 (1939).
See. 58:

See also:

RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS

(1935),

"Tentative Trust of Savings Deposit.
"Where a person makes a deposit in savings account in a 'bank in his
own name as trustee for another person Intending to reserve a power
to withdraw the whole or any part of 'the deposit at any time during
his lifetime and to use as his own whatever he may withdraw, or
otherwise to revoke the trust, the intended trust is enforceable by the
beneficiary upon the death of the depositor as to any part remaining
on deposit on his death if he has not revoked the trust."
There is no distinction between free Share account In building association
and savings account in bank as respects creation of trusts. Birean v.
Bohemian Building Loan and Savings Ass'n., 109 A. 2d 120 (Md., 1954).
5This decision Is in line with the weight of authority in the United
States; see 64 A. L. R. 467. The case is also in conformity with other Maryland cases as analyzed in Sykes, Inter Vivo8 Transfers in Violation of the
Right8 of Survziving Spouses, 10 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1949).
6199 Md. 541, 550, 87 A. 2d 608 (1952), noted in 14 Md. L. Rev. 350
(1954), dealing for the most part with a different aspect of the case. Italics
supplied.
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in the case of dower, has an unqualified right to give
away his personal property during his life time even
though the effect is to deprive the wife of her statutory
share. But if the gift is not absolute and unconditional
and the donor retains dominion and control over the
property during his lifetime, the courts have held that
the gift, is colorable and may be set aside."
The facts of the Allender case were that the deceased husband during his life had added the names of two sons by a
previous marriage to the registry for access to his safe
deposit box, and had stocks transferred from his name individually to his name and one of his children using the
terms "jointly and to survivor". The husband died intestate
and if the widow could have defeated the transfers, she
would have gained only $3,000.00. Also in that case the
deceased had exercised considerable dominion and control
over the stock by voting and collecting the dividends, but
it was held this did not invalidate the transfers as being a
fraud on the marital rights of the wife. In the Whittington
case the widow only stood to gain approximately $5,700.0'0
if the joint bank accounts had been set aside and was substantially well taken care of otherwise.
In another leading case, Sturgis v. Citizens National
Bank,7 the facts were that the husband and wife had been
married for many years and then were estranged for 10
years. Later they were reconciled, living together for 5
years until the husband's death. There were no children
or descendants involved, but the beneficiary was a grandniece of the deceased. The widow was to receive %A of
$40,000 to $50,000 over and above the bank accounts in question and the court held that there was no fraud. Again it
is apparent that the widow was adequately provided for.
But the leading case of Mushaw v. Mushaw, holds that
there was a fraud on marital rights of the wife where the
husband died leaving almost all his property in four tentative trusts for his four children by a previous marriage.
He left no estate except $90.00 in the bank, some shares of
stock and a bond worth $100.00, a house and lot where he
resided, and some personal effects. In this case the widow
was virtually stripped of all property and the court rightly
held that this was a fraud on her marital rights.
By its very nature the test as to whether a gift is absolute and unconditional will vary in different situations, and
152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378 (1927).
8183 Md. 511, 39 A. 2d 465 (1944).
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the Court of Appeals has recognized that the test for determining the existence of such fraud is a matter of degree.'
Such a test is not a sound one when dealing with tangible
property rights. 10 It has been held in Maryland that even
if the widow shows that the tentative trust was created for
the expressed purpose and intent of defeating her statutory
heirship, this in and of itself is not sufficient to make the
widow's case conclusive as to the existence of a fraud on
the widow's marital rights."
A glance at the historical background may throw some
light on the development of the above rules. Throughout
the history of the common law, society has sought to protect widows from husbands that have attempted by means
of a will or otherwise to deprive the surviving spouse of
her rightful share in their property. The law says that a
husband must provide reasonable support for his wife during his life. Can he deprive her of such support after death?
In the days of the common law, when land was such an
important essential to the economic structure and man's
wealth was determined by land, the law gave the widow
dower rights in the land held by her husband to protect
her. Later as the importance of land decreased in relationship to other material goods, many states passed statutes
giving the widow statutory heirship in both personalty and
realty. This was done in order that the widow would receive a sufficient share in her husband's estate to take care
of her economic needs and thus not become a public charge
on the state. 2 Several states, including Maryland, have
enacted election statutes whereby if the widow is not satisfied with the provisions made for her in her husband's will
she can renounce under the will and take her statutory
share. 13 But in order for statutory heirship to accomplish
the intended result, there must be something in the estate
left by the husband.
Thus, a loophole in the legislative scheme has been
found by the creation of tentative trusts. Where the hus9

Ibid, 517: "This may be a matter of degree, but it appears to be the
only basis upon which the decisions can be reconciled."
10 In Allender v. Allender, supra, n. 6, 549, it was said:
"It must be admitted, however, that the test of degree does not commend itself as a legal criterion."
1Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank, supra, n. 7, 660; Poole v. Poole, 129
Md. 387, 99 A. 551 (1916) ; Whitehill v. Theiss, 161 Md. 657, 158 A. 347
(1932). See also 64 A. L. R. 466.
For the minority rule, see: 64 A. L. R. 492.
2It is submitted that no equity court would allow the husband to com-

pletely strip the widow of all property, so that she would become a public
charge, by use of a tentative trust. Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra, n. 8.
"Md.

Code (1951), Art. 93, Sec. 325.
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band does not have his wealth in land, dower is of no benefit
to the widow; and where through the use of a tentative
trust he does not hold it in such a manner that it will go
into his estate, statutory heirship is of no benefit to the
widow. He employs a bank account trust and names someone other than his wife as beneficiary, and on his death the
proceeds of the tentative trust pass to the named beneficiary
and not to his estate. The cases having shown how very
difficult it is for the widow to have a court of equity set
aside a tentative trust, it is suggested that if the policy of
the law is to protect the interests of surviving spouses the
legislature could enact legislation whereby the entire balance left in a tentative trust by the husband at the time of
his death would become a part of his estate for the purpose
of increasing the statutory share of the surviving spouse.
The balance after the widow has received her share should
go to the named beneficiary and the fund should not remain
in the estate for other purposes. The law does not want to
hinder the free alienation of personalty because trade and
commerce are too dependent upon its free and unlimited
alienability. The tentative trusts have also been found to
be a good method for the handling of small estates, so no
ban is advocated upon their further creation. Inheritance
tax statutes treat tentative trusts as part of the decedent's
estate for statutory heirship purposes.
Pennsylvania has recognized the aforegoing problem
and has enacted a statute treating a tentative trust as part
of the husband's estate as to statutory heirship. 1 4 Actually
the Pennsylvania statute deals with problems other than
tentative trusts by providing that the statute shall apply to
powers of appointment retained by the donor of such a
power; it also applies if the person has a right to consume
the principal of a fund. In conclusion, it is suggested that
consideration might well be given by the Maryland Legislature to the enactment of similar legislation to provide for
the widow of a deceased husband who has part of his
property in one or more tentative trusts.
14Purdon Penna. Statutes (1950), Title 20, Sec. 301.11 Powers of
Appointment - Rights of surviving spouse:
"A conveyance of assets by a person who retains a power of appointment by will, or a power of revocation or consumption over the principal
thereof, shall at the election of his surviving spouse, be treated as a
testamentary disposition so far as the surviving spouse is concerned to
the extent to which the power has been reserved, but the right of the
surviving spouse shall be subject to the rights of any income beneficiary
whose interest in income becomes vested in enjoyment prior to the death
of the conveyor."
1947, April 24, P. L. 100 Sec. 11.

